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Undoubtedly one of the most important studies in evolutionary cognitive 
psychology is Cosmides' (1989) analysis of content effects on the Wason 
selection task in terms of adaptive cheater detection. However, in her land-
mark paper, Cosmides ventured beyond the confines of the selection task to 
argue for a bold new synthesis of evolutionary biology and cognitive psych-
ology llsing Marr's (l982) concept of a computat ional theory as the bridge 
between these two disciplines. Following Marr's lead, Cosmides argued that 
cognitive psychology could not make progress unless it was informed by task 
analyses of the problems the mind was designed to solve. These task analyses 
would ultimately be supplied by evolutionary theory, which specializes in the 
study of natural design. Social Contract Theory, Cosmides' specific account 
of content effects on the Wason selection task, was merely one illustrative 
part of a larger programme, evolutionary psychology. Unfortunately, the 
double message of Cosmides' (1989) paper has generaled a considerable 
amount of confusion as some appear to have confused Social Contract The-
ory as a general theory of reasoning whereas the true scope of the theory is 
much narrower. In this chapter I hope to dispel some of the confusion sur-
rounding Social Contract Theory and, in the process. clarify where some of 
the difIiculties facing the theory lie and where they do not. 
Cosmides (1989) illustrated the benefits offered by un evolutionary per-
spective by making an example of the then puzzling literature on the Wason 
selection task. The Wason selection task was originally developed by Peter 
Wason (1968) as a lest of people's ability to logically falsiey a hypothesis. By 
then, the selection task had already generated a large literature, for while it is 
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disarmingly simple, the selection task has proven to be notoriously ditlicult 
for subjects to solve. Tn the task, subjects are given a conditional rule of the 
form: "If P then Q", which applies to four cards with information on both 
sides. One side of each card states whether or not "P" is true, and all the 
other side of the card it states whether or not "Q" is true. Only one side of 
each card is showing (depicting the information "P", "not-P", "Q" and "not-
Q") and the subjects' task is to determine which, if any, of the four cards they 
would need to turn over to determine if the rule has been violated. Since the 
rule is only logically violated when "P" is true and "Q" is false ("P & not-Q"), 
the solution is straightforward: Subjects need to turn over the "P" and "not-
Q" cards since these cards, and only these cards, could potentially be 
instances of "P & llot-Q". Yet, on standard versions of the task, typically 
fewer than 10 per cent of subjects solve it correctly. 
This discrepancy between the apparent simplicity of the task and the 
overwhelming failure of subjects to solve it correctly has generated a large 
literature dedicated to figuring out what the source of the difficulty is and 
what, if anything, can be done to improve performance. Initially, some studies 
seemed to suggest that when 1110rC realistic fules are employed (Wason (1968) 
had employed the abstract rules such as: "If there is a D on one side of any 
card, then there is a 3 on its other side") performance on the task improves 
(e.g. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, & Legrenzi, 1972; Wason & Shapiro, 1971); 
however, later studies employing realistic rules failed to replicate the 
improvements (e.g. Manktelow & Evans, 1979). Later still there was some 
indication that prior experience with the rules was crucial to improved per-
formance on the task (Griggs & Cox, 1982), although this interpretation has 
since been ruled out (Cosmides, 1989). Hence, by the early 19805 there was a 
confusing pattern of "content effects" whereby versions of the selection task 
employing some thematic contents but not others inexplicably enhanced 
performance on the selection task. 
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
It is in this context that Cosmides (1985, 1989) first proposed Social Contract 
Theory (SCT), formulated on the basis of an evolutionary task analysis of 
social cooperation-"~the computational theory of social exchange (Cosmides 
& To o by, 1989). Drawing upon prior evolutionary task analyses of reci-
procity suggesting that social cooperation among nankin could evolve only if 
altruists could detcct and punisb/exclude cheaters (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971), the computational theory of social exchange 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1989) hypothesizes that humans possess an evolved 
"look for cheaters" algorithm that is activated in situations involving the 
reciprocal exchange of benefits, that is, social exchange. In the Wason 
selection task, an offer to engage in social exchange can be expressed by a 
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social contract rule of the form: "If you take the benefit then you must pay 
the cost", where a cheater is someone \\'ho "takes the benefit" but "doesn't 
pay the cost". Previous studies demonstrating improved logical performance 
had, according to Cosmides (1989), unwittingly employed social contract 
rules and triggered the "look for cheaters" algorithm, This mental algorithm 
would then lead subjects to select the "benefit" ("P") and "no-cost" ("not-
Q") cards and, thereby, fortuitously make the logically correct selection. 
In support of this analysis, Cosmides (1989) constructed parallel versions 
of the selection task, one in \",hich the context of the rule gave it thc costl 
benefit structure of a social contract and another lacking the cost/bcnefit 
interpretation. As predicted by SCT, subjects selected the logically correct 
"benefit" CP") and "no-cost" ("not-Q") cards when the rule had thc costl 
benefit structure of a social contract, but failed to do so when it did not-a 
result that has su bsequel1tly been replicated in numerous experiments 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzcr & Hug, 1992; Platt & Griggs, 1993). 
Cosmides (1989) presented SCT as an illustrative example of the results 
that can be achieved by adopting the evolutionary psychological framework, 
a metathcoretical framework for conducting all psychological research. 
Unfortunately, confusion quickly arose as to the precise scope of Cosmides' 
claims, with many seeming to interpret SCT -and not the evolutionary psy-
chological framework-·~.as a general theory of thc mind, particularly reaSOll-
ing, and not as a more restricted theory of social cooperation, If it were to be 
argued that Cosmides proposed a theory of reasoning, tout court, then that 
theory or reasoning would have to be the larger framework, evolutionary 
pSY'chology, which argues tor an adaptive, TIlultimodular view of 110t only 
reasoning, but of a1l mental processes. Yet, the claim is routinely made that 
SCT, and not evolutionary psychology pel' se, is raulty or at best incomplete 
because it cannot account for instances of content effects on nonsocial 
contract versions of the selection task (Ahnor & Sloman, 1996; Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1989; Girotto, BJaye, & Farioli, 1989a: Manktelow & Over, 1990; 
Politzer & Nguyen-Xuan, 1992f with reference often made to COSlllides' 
'One constraint upon a weJl-formulated social contract is tllat tile benefits of social cooper-
ation outweigh the costs, B> C (Trivers, 1971). Tilis constraint is easily satisfied when C = O. such 
that a social contract can he well-formed even when the "cost" is a eostless requiremenL. Sec 
Appendix A,I in Fiddiek, Cosmides. and Tooby (2000) for further clarification. 
'A peculiar corollary is the widely held vicw that Gigcrcnzcr ,md Hug (1992) have proposed an 
altcrtllltive thcory of dean tie reasoning based upon a cheating option that is in some sense an 
aitcrn,l1ive to SCT, \vhere Gigerenzer and Hug's proposal remains viable even though SeT is 
falsified (e.g. Almor & SIOlll.Ul, :WOO: Girotto. 1991, Holyoak & Cheng, 1995). This error. I 
would suggest. is the re~;u!t of a tendency to vicw SCT ,imply as a theory of content effects in 
reasoning. instead of as a functionalist theory of cooperation. The fUllction of the "look for 
cheaters" alglll'ilhm is specified at the level of the computational theory, in this case the computa-
tional theory of social exchange (Cosrnides & Tooby. 1989) from which Gigcrcnzcr and Hug's 
(1992) theory is derived. 
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(1989) claim that "robust and replicable content effects are found only for 
rules that are standard social contracts". Invariably, this claim is taken as a 
prediction of SCT, specifically the prediction that people should be com-
petent only at reasoning about social contracts. However, Cosmides was not 
making a prediction, as the full context of the claim (v,,:hich is never given) 
makes clear: 
Previous results on the Wason selection task arc consistent with a social 
contract interpretation (for (I detailed review, sec Cosmides, 1985). Robust 
and reliable content dTects arc found only for rules that relate terms that arc 
recognizable as benefits and costs in the format of a standard social contract. 
(Cosmides 1989. pp. 199-200) 
Moreover, social contract theory explains the apparently contradictory litera-
ture attempting to stalk the "elusive" content dT\:ct on the Wason selection 
ta~k: robust and reli8ble content etTects arc found only for mles that are stand· 
ard social contracts - the only rules for which the predicted social contract 
response is also the logically falsifying response. 
(Cosmitics. 1989, pp. 262} 
As these quotes make perfectly clear, Cosmides was sLlmmarizing the past 
selection task literature, and not making a prediction about selection task 
performance in nonsocial contract domains. While there may be reasonable 
grounds for objecting to Cosmides' assessment of the selection task literature 
circa the late 19805, SCT cannot be faulted for the failure of a prediction it 
does not make. Neither SeT, nor the larger evolutionary psychology frame-
work. predicts that theLI logically correct performance cannot be elicited on 
nonsocial contract versions of the selection task. Yet many of the arguments 
against SeT have tended to fOCllS on the theory's failure to account for 
enhanced reasoning on nonsocial contract rules. 
Does reasoning about precautions falsify Social 
Contract Theory? 
People do routinely solve certain nonsocial contract versions of the Wason 
selection task correctly. In particular, numerous studies have demonstrated 
enhanced levels of performance on precautionary versions of the Wason 
selection task (Cheng & Holyoak, 1989: Fiddick. 1998: Fiddick, Cosmides, & 
Tooby, 2000: Girotto, Gilly. Blaye, & Light, 1989b; Love & Kessler, 1995; 
Manktelow & Over. 1990). Whereas asocial contract is a rule of the form: "If 
you take the benefi t then you must pay the cost", a preca uti on is a rule of the 
form: "If the hazard exists then you must usc protection", and all parties to 
this intellectual dispute agree that precautions do not fall within the scope of 
SCT (Cheng & Holyoak. 1989; Fiddiek, 1998; Fiddick et at, 2000; Girotto et 
aI., 1989a; Manktelow & Over, 1990; Politzer & NgUycll-Xuan, 1992). 
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In and of itself, these findings are damaging to SCT only to the extent that 
it is a general theory of reasoning, which it is not. Indeed, one of the most 
controversial aspects of SCT is the proposal that the reasoning mechanism 
involved is a module-a reasoning instinct~that is activated by a narrow 
range of contexts, in this case social relationships involving the exchange or 
regulation of benefits. It is the very domain-specificity of the proposed mech-
anism that places precautions beyond the scope of SeT (see Chapter 1). One 
should ask instead whether the evolutionary psychology framework, more 
generally, and not SeT specifically, can account for people's reasoning in 
nonsocial contract domains. With respect to precaution rules, Fiddick (1998; 
Fiddick et aI., 2000), following Cosmides and Tooby (1992), has argued that 
people possess additional reasoning instincts for managing hazards. Hence, 
the real question with precautionary rules is not whether they fall within the 
domain of SCT -all sides agree that they do not-but whether people reason 
about social contracts and precautions using a common mental mechanism 
or whether these rules invoke distinct reasoning mechanisms (Fiddick, 1998). 
The claim that enhanced performance on precaution problems argues 
against SCT merely begs the question for it assumes, but never demonstrates, 
that a common mental mechanism underlies reasoning about both social 
contracts and precautions. While it is true that both social contracts and 
precautions tend to elidt logically correct performance on the selection task, 
so do abstract rules with negated consequents3 but few researchers feel 
compelled to argue that all three types of rules are handled by the same 
psychological mechanism (Sperber, eara, & Giratto, 1995, being a notable 
exception). Likewise, few are tempted to argue that the logical similarity of 
responses elicited by abstract letter and number rules and nondeontic 
thematic rules suggests their psychological equivalence, Hence, the logical 
analysis of selection task performance provides a weak assay of people's 
understanding of rules. Still, social contracts and precautions, but not 
abstract rules with negated consequents, intuitively seem to be related types 
of rules and the observation that both types of rules elicit similar perform-
ance on the selection task is consistent with the proposal that a common 
reasoning faculty is operative. 
THE DEONTIC ALTERNATIVE 
What social contracts and precautions have in common is that they are both 
deontic rules, rules specifying actions that one is obligated or entitled to 
perform, and it is this feature of social contracts and precautions that is 
, In a finding that has often been replicated, Evans and Lynch (1973) demonstrated thal people 
routinely provide the corre~! logical answer to versions of the selection task employing abstract 
rules of the form: "If P then NOT Q". 
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widely held to aCCOLlnt for enhanced performance when they are embedded in 
the Wason selection task (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989; Cummins, 1996a, 
1996b: Girotto, 1991; Manktclow & Over, 1990, 1991, 1995). The most 
influential of these accounts is Chcng and Holyoak's (1985) Pragmatic Rea-
soning Schemas Theory (PRST). This proposes that people reason about 
practical real-world problems using abstract knowledge structures, pragmatic 
reasoning schemas, that are compiled from personal experiences with differ-
ent problem domains. One problem domain that people have considerable 
experience with is rules regulating behaviour: permissions and obligations. A 
permission, for example, is a rule with the abstract form: "If the action is to 
be taken then the precondition must be satisfied". Experience with such rules 
leads to the construction of a pennissiol1 schema composed of fOllr produc-
tion rules that guides inferences about thcm. The four rules of the permission 
schema are the following (Holyoak & Cheng, 1995, p. 291): 
PI: If the action is to be taken, then thc precondition must be satisfied. 
P2: If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be 
satisfied. 
P3: If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
P4 If the precondition is not satisfied, then the aClion must not be taken. 
When the conditional rule employed in a selection task is a permission match-
ing rule PI of the permission schema: ·'If the action is to be taken then the 
precondition must be satisfied". the permission schema becomes activated. 
Logically correct performance follows as Rule P J or the schema causes sub-
jects to select the "action to be taken" ("P") card and Rule P4 causes subjccts 
to select the "precondition is not satisfied" ("not-Q") card. Rules P2 and P3 
indicate that it is irrelevant that the "action is not to be taken" ("not-P") and 
"precondition is satisfied" ("Q") cards, respectively. Therefore, the cards cor-
responding to these conditions need not to be selected. Like SeT, PRST also 
predicts that social contracts qua permission rules 'will elicit a high level of 
logically correct "P & not-Q" selections on the Wason selection task. How-
ever, unlike SCT PRST also predicts that precautions, 100, will elicit logically 
correct performance, since they also match the form of a permission rule. 
In one of the key tests of the theory, Cheng and Holyoak (1985, Experi-
ment 2) presented subjects with an abstract permission version of the selec-
tion task. The rule employed in this problem stated: "If one is to take action 
'A', then one must first satisfy precondition 'P"', which matches Rule P I of 
the permission schema. Perlormance \vith this rule \vas contrasted with per-
formance on a version of the selection task employing the abstract nondcon-
tic conditional: "If a card has an 'A' on one side, then it must have a '4' on the 
other side", which fails to map on to permission schema. As predicted, 61 per 
cent of subjects correctly solved the abstract permission problem compared 
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to only 19 per cenl correct on the nondeontic problem. This finding has 
been challenged in studies claiming that the effect is vulnerable to minor 
alterations in the presentation of the problem (Jackson & Griggs, 1990) or 
changes in instructions (Novcck & O'Brien, 1996). However, these objections 
are either orthogonal to or predicted by the PRST, and the clTect ofthese mani-
pulations disappears when more carefully designed problems are employed 
(Girotto, Mazzocco. & Cherubini, 1992; Kroger. Cheng & Holyoak, 1993). 
ABSTRACT DEONTIC RULES ARE PROBLEMATIC 
FOR SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
The demonstration that subjects can correctly solve abstract deontic versions 
of the Wason selection task is widely held to be amongst the most compelling 
evidence in support of PRST, yet in the debate between advocates of SCT 
and those of PRST, scant attention is paid to the deep diHiculty that these 
rules pose to SCT. Yet the reason these rules pose a difficulty for SCT is 
straightforward. Subjects' ability to reason successfully about abstract 
deontic rules directly challenges the assllmption that people rely upon more 
specialized reasoning mechanisms, be they a "look for cheaters" algorithm or 
procedures for managing hazards. Whereas social contracts and precautions 
require one to assume a common deontic schema, abstract deontic rules 
would appear to direc/ly map onto the proposed schemas. Furthermore, 
advocates of SCT cannot simply propose an abstract deontic instinct without 
calling into q uestioll the rationale for distinct social contract and precaution 
mechanisms, since they would thereby be redundant. 
Despite the obvious similarities between the abstract deontic rules 
employed in the selection task and the production rules in the proposed 
schemas, the importance or these findings depends upon whether subjects are 
reasoning with the abstract form of the rules as explicitly stated in the prob-
lem materials or whether they are reasoning with some other representation 
or the rules. PRST is only supported, and SCT flawed, to the extent that 
subjects do, in fact, map the abstract rules directly onto the hypothesized 
schemas. Although abstract deontic rules bear an obvious resemblance to the 
hypothesized production rules, it nevertheless remains an untested assump-
tion that these rules are closer to the internal mental representation than are 
social contracts and precautions. 
Cosmides (1989) has claimed that subjects interpret abstract permission 
rules as social contract rules, thereby triggering a search for cheaters as pre-
dicted by SeT. According to Cosmides (1989, p. 239) an abstract permission 
is implicitly a social contract because: 
... saying that one must fulfill or satisfy a precondition ill order to be permitted 
to do something is just another way of saying that one must pay a cost or meet a 
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requirement ... In addition. s8ying that someone is permitted to take action A 
linguistically marks "action A" as a rationed benefit: it implies that the person 
H'w7Is to take action A (your mother permits you (0 get icc cream, she does 
not "permit'· you to be spanked), and it implies that the perSall doing the 
permitting has the power to forbid action A (emphasis in the origll1ai). 
As Cosmides' (1989) analysis of abstract permission problems suggests, there 
are at least two ways to interpret people's reasoning about abstract pennis-
sions. Either people could be mentally rcpresen ting abstract permissions in a 
manner very close to their surface form (as Rule PI oC the permission 
schema) and then invoking the appropriate schema; or they could be mentally 
representing the abstract permissions in a manner more distant from their 
surface form (as a social contract) and then invoking a "look for cheaters" 
algorithm. While the basic finding that people reason correctly with an 
abstract problem is impressive, it is not clear whether people are interpreting 
the rules as explicit permissions or implicit social contracts. 
How do people interpret abstract deontic rules? 
There are two possibilities to be considered: (I) people interpret the abstract 
permissions as explicitly stated in the problems and map them directly onto 
the deontic schemCls postulated by PRST; or (2) people interpret the abstract 
permissions as implicit social contracts and thereby activate the "look for 
cheaters" algorithm postulated by SCT. One way to test bct\-veen these possi. 
bilities is to llse the following principle: the closer the surface form of a rule 
matches the representations processed by a cognitive mechanism, the more 
likely that mechanism will be invoked. For example, Jackson and Griggs 
(1990, Experiment 2) found that performance on abstract permission prob-
lems decreased when the cards representing "not-P" and "[Wl·Q" used 
implicit negatives, for example, rather than stating "Has not taken action A". 
the "not-P" card read "Has taken action B". Kroger et a!.'s (1993, p. 622) 
explanation for this result was that: "explicit negatives will make it easier to 
match the 110HI case to Rule 4 of the permission schema. Accordingly, remov-
ing [this factor] should diminish facilitation for the abstract permission rule". 
By the same logic, given two equally abstract rules~both of which are 
hypothesized to feed into the same mechanism~that which elicits the great· 
est amount of facilitation should be closer to the form of representation 
processed by the underlying mechanism. 
PRST and SCT propose that abstract permissions are mentally repre-
sented in different ways. PRST proposes that the abstract permission: "If one 
is to take action' A', then one must first satisfy precondition 'P'''. is mapped 
onto Rule PI of the permission schema: "If the action is to be taken. then the 
precondition must be satisfied". SCT proposes that the abstract permission is 
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mapped onto the representation of a social contract: "If the benefit is 
accepted, then the cost must be paid". Hence, SCT predicts that more of a 
transformation needs to be made in order to map the abstract permission 
onto the underlying mechanism, \vhereas PRST predicts the opposite~­
more of a transformation needs to be made to map the abstract social con-
tract. The end result is that PRST predicts that performance on an abstract 
permission problem will be better than that observed on an abstract social 
contract problem. SeT predicts thc opposite. 
IS A SOCIAL CONTRACT A PERMISSION OR IS A 
PERMISSION A SOCIAL CONTRACT? 
Past studies of abstract deonlic versions of the selection task have featured 
abstract permissions (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Girotto et a1., 1992; Jackson 
& Griggs, 1990; Kroger et aI., 1993; Noveck & O'Brien, 1996), abstract obli-
gations (Girotto et aI., 1992: Jackson & Griggs, 1990; Novcck & O'Brien, 
1996), and an abstract precaution (Cheng & Holyoak, 1989). There have been 
no published studies in which an abstract social contract rule was employed. 
Hence, it is difiicult to judge the relative ease with which people reason about 
abstract permissions, on the one hand, and abstract social contracts on the 
other. 
I attempted to fill this empirical gap by testing subjects on abstract social 
contract, pcnnissioll, obligation and precaution versions of the Wason selec-
tion task. As outlined above .. PRST predicts that people Villi perform better 
when reasoning about abstract permissions than when reasoning about 
abstract social contracts. SCT predicts the opposite. Similar predictions can 
be made with respect to ab~tl'act precautions and their corresponding 
abstract deontic rules. PRST predicts that people wjll perform better when 
reasoning about abstract permissions and obligations than when reasoning 
about a corresponding abstract precaution. The more domain-specific view 
of precautions proposed by Fiddick (1998; Fiddick et aI., 2000) predicts the 
opposite: performance will be higher on abstract precaution problems than 
on abstract permission and obligation problems since abstract precautions 
are easier to input into the hypothesized hazard management mechanism. 
Hereafter, I shall refer to abstract precautions and social contracts collect-
ively as adapti~'e rules, and abstract permissions and obligations as deolltic 
rules. In summary, PRST predicts that performance will be higher on the 
deontic rules and the evolutionary psychology framework4 predicts that 
performance will be higher on adaptive rules. I tested the~c contrasting 
• Comprised. 111 thIS case, of SCT and additional account or precautions (Fiddick, 1998: 
Fiddick el a1., 2000). 
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predictions by giving three groups of subjects, who were na'ive to the selection 
task, abstract versions of the task. 
The first group of 20 5ubjecls received tv.·o abstract deontic versions of the 
selection task. These were Cheng and HoIYOClk's (1985, Experiment 2) 
abstract permission problem and Jackson and Griggs' (1990, Experiment 1) 
abstract obligation problem. The abstract permission problem featured the 
rule: ;, I f one is to take action A, then one must first satisfy precondition V', 
whereas the abstract obligation problem featured the rule: "If situation I 
arises, then Clction A must be taken". 
A second group of 20 subjects received two abstract adaptive versions of 
the selection task. These were a variant of Cheng and Holyoak's (1989) 
abstract precaution problem and an abstract social contract problem of my 
own design. The abstract precaution problem fcalured the rule: "If one is to 
take the dangerous action D, then one must have protection P", whereas the 
abstra<:i socia! contract problem featured the rule: "If the benefit B is taken, 
then cost C must be paid". The abstract social contract problem was identical 
to the Cheng and Holyoak's abstract permission problem other than the 
change in rule and the necessary changes to the cards and supporting 
scenario that this required. 
Finally, a third group of 20 subjects received two abstract contl'O/ problems 
to assess baseline leveb of performance on the selection task. Where others 
have contrasted performance on abstract deontic versions of the selection 
tasks wi th performance on abstract letter and number versions of the selec-
tion task (e.g. Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, Experiment 2; Girotto et a!.. 1992; 
Jackson & Griggs. 1990: Kroger et at, 1993; Noveck & O'Brien, 1996), I 
chose to devise comrol problems that more closely paralleled the deontic and 
adaptive versions of the task. Hence, this last group of subjects received 
selection tasks employing abstract rules that described peop!c's actions. No 
modal verbs were employed, nor were subjects cued to adopt the perspective 
of an authority enforcing the rule, but they were still instructed to look Lor 
violations. In the abstract action problem, subjects read that, "The following 
rule describes people's behavior: 'If one takes action E, then one takes action 
A '." The rule in this task was desib'1led to match the abstract permission. In 
the abstract situation problem. subjects read that "The following rule 
de::;cribes people's behavior: 'II situation I arises, then one takes action A'." 
The rule in this task was designed to match the abstract obligation. 
Do people reason better with abstract deontic or 
abstract adaptive rules? 
As predicted by the evolutionary psychology framework, performance was 
highest on the adaptive problems (Fig. 2.1) with 50 per cent of subjects 
correctly solving the precaution problem and 45 per cent correctly solving the 
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Figure 2.1 Perc~nlage of correct responses on the abstract selection tasks. The error bars 
represent one standard deviation ilbove and below the mean. SC, social contract. 
social contract (SC) problem. Performance on the deontic problems was 
midway between that on the adaptive problems and the control problems: 30 
pcr cent correct on the obligation problem and only 20 per cent correct on the 
permission problem. Performance was lowest on the control problems, 15 per 
cent on the situation problem and 10 per cent correct on the action problem. 
On average, subjects did significantly better on the adaptive problems than on 
the deontic problems. Summing performance across the adaptive problems 
and the deontic problems, the adaptive problem~ were correctly solved 48 per 
cent of the time, compared to 25 per cent for the deontic problems. While 
subjects performed significantly better 011 the adaptive problems than their 
matched controls," there was no significant difference in performance 
between the deontic problems and their matched controls. 6 
The results of this experiment were in general agreement with the evo-
lutionary psychology framework. Subjects appeared to find it easier to map 
abstract sodal contract and precaution rules onto the mechanisms postulated 
to underlie deontic reasoning. This suggests that the surface form of abstract 
social contracts and precautions is closer to the input conditions of the 
underlying mechanisms than is the surface form of abstract permissions and 
; Abstract social contract versus action (2 ~ 2AS,p < .01, II '" .83); abstract precaution versus 
action (Z ~ 2.76. /' < .005. h = .93). All Z scores reported are the result of a test 0[" proportions 
(Blalock, 1972). II is the effect size for a test of proporti()n~: h ~ .20, small etfect; Ii ~ .50, medium 
effect; Ii = .SO. large effect (Coben. 1977). 
(. Abstract permission versus action (7 = 0.89, p > .10. II = .28): abstract obligation versus 
situation (7 = 1.14. P > .10.11 = .36). 
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obligations. Consequently, it is problematic to conclude that subjects in pre-
vious studies were menta lly representing abstract permissions and obligations 
In a manner similar to their surface form. The purportedly strong evidence in 
favour of PRST is, at best, ambiguous in its support for the theory. 
EMOTIONS AS A CUE TO INTERPRETATION 
Although the previous experiment raised some doubt about whether people 
interpret abstract permissions and obligations explicitly as stated in the prob-
lem materiab, it sheds no positive light on 110\\1 people do, in fact, interpret 
these rules. The results provide little direct evidence in support of Cosmides' 
(1989) <..:Iaim that people interpret abstract permissions as social contracts. 
Again, the eards that people select on the Wason selection task is a poor 
guide in determining how people interpret a rule. Consider, again, social 
contracts and conditionals with negated consequents. They both routinely 
elicit "p & not-Q" selections on the Wason selection task, but this provides 
little reason for believing that people are interpreting both types of rules in 
the same way. Hence, the fact that both abstract socia! contracts and abstract 
permissions elicit -'P & 110t-Q" selection is 110 guarantee that people reason 
about both types of rules lLsing the same mental mechanism. Although 
unlikely, people could be interpreting the abstract permissions as precautions, 
tor example, which would also lead them to select the "P & not-Q" cards. Less 
ambiguous evidence is required to substantiate Cosmides' proposal. 
Emotional reactions to rule violations can potentially provide an alterna-
tive means of categorizing dcontic rules. Rozill. Lowery, Imada and Haidt 
(1999) have found that different moral codes are associated with different 
emotions. One of the methods they used was to give people descriptions of 
moral violations and have them select which fadal expression a person would 
show if that perSOll \vitnessed the violation. This same method could poten-
tially be employed to assess how people interpret abstract permissions and 
obligations. 
Indeed, Rozin et aL's method can be used to dissociate social contracts 
from precautions. Using a modification of this method for the Wason selec-
tion task, J have found that people associate different emotions with viola-
tions of social contracts and precautions (FiddicL unpUblished). Subjects 
were presented with a rule embedded in a story, as with the Wason selection 
task. However, rather than instructing subjects to select cards representing 
potential violations, they were informed that the rule has been broken and 
their task was to indicate who, among an array of four people, saw the viola-
tion oeCllr. The faces of the people varied in the emotions that they expressed. 
The results of this study indicated that people associate different types of 
rules with difTerent emotions. In principle, the same method could easily 
be applied Lo abstract rules providing a converglOg line of evidence for 
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the psychological equivalence of social contracts and permissions. Besides 
eliciting logically identical performance on the selection task, abstract social 
contracts and permissions might also elicit the same emotional reactions 
when they arc violated. 
The emotions associated with the rule violations were anger for social 
contracts and fear for precautions. This pattern of emotional reactions is 
readily explained from an evolutionary point of view. Consider first social 
contracts and anger. The goal in detecting cheaters, according to SeT, is to be 
able to punish or exclude them. It is this element of punishment that makes 
anger a suitable emotion to express, for as Lazarus (1991. p. 225) describes 
anger: 
I suggest that anger. in contrast with fright and nnxiety, is potentiated by an 
appraisal that the demeaning offense is best {(lI1e/iowled hy attack; in effect, the 
individual em/llates Iler coping po/entia! o/"l71ollluing an atlack favorab/.F, which 
is also the innately given action tendency (emphasis added). 
In short, anger is the emotion that is elicited when one seeks to punish others 
for a harmful \vrongdoing. Consider, on the other hand, precautions and 
fcar. According to the evolutionary analysis of precautions (Fiddick. 1998: 
Fiddick et al. 1000), the goal is to manage hazards. It is this element of 
avoiding or preventl11g injury that makes fear a suitable emotion, for as Laza-
rus (1991, p. 238) states: "In both fright and anxiety, the action tendency is 
avoidance or escape, in contrast with approach or attack". While violations 
of both social contracts and precautions may involve some form of loss or 
harm. the assignment of blame is an important component of cheater detec-
tion that is typically absent from hazard management. Like\vise, blame is an 
important component of anger, but is absent from fear (Lazarus. 1991). In 
short, there are good functional grounds Jor predicting that anger will be 
associated with violations of social contracts and that fear will be associated 
with violations of precautions. 
Moreover, this same line of argument suggests that there might be dilTer-
ent types of precautions. There are grounds for distinguishing precautions 
against physical injury, from precautions against infections and socia I aggres-
sion. Whereas the threat of physical injury is typically associated with fear. 
the threat of infectious contHmination is more closely associated with disgust. 
Similarly, Lazarus (1991) has argued that it might be best to distinguish 
between "fright" as elicited specifically by the threat of physical injury and 
"fear". which may include the threat of social aggression. Intuitively, these 
three types of hazards arc quite distinct and may impose different computa-
tional demands, but whether there are characteristic differences in prudential 
reasoning about these three domains of hazards \'li1l have to remain an open 
q nest ion lor future research. For now I will simply assume that precautionary 
rules employed in these studies arc interpreted in terms of physical injury. 
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Instead, I investigated which emotions are associated with abstract per-
missions and obligations by devising some abstract adaptive and abstract 
deontic versions of the emotion selection task. 1 presented 21 subjects with 
four abstract versions of the emotion selection task. These included an 
abstract social contract task, an abstract precaution task, an abstract permis-
sion task, and an abstract obligation task. The tasks repeated the rules and 
stories employed in the \Vason selection tasks in the previous experiment, but 
without the cards and their supporting statements. In their place were the 
pictures of four faces with each face depicting a different emotion. The four 
emotions were anger, disgust, fear, and happiness. The pictures were scanned, 
greyscale reproductions from Matsumoto and Ekman's (1988) Japanese and 
Caucasian Facial Expression of Emotion (JACFEE) slides, hO\vever, only 
Caucasian faces (of both sexes) were used. The accompanying story 
explained that "Recently someone observed the rule being broken. Indicate 
the person, who you think, saw the rule being broken". 
What do PRST and the evolutionary framework 
predict for the deontic rules? 
Although neither PRST nor SCT make explicit predictions about the emo-
tional reactions that people will have in response to deontic rule violations, 
deducing the predictions that they would have to make given previous find-
ings with adaptive rule violations is fairly straightforward (Fig. 2.2). Recall 
that violations of social contracts elicit angry reactions whereas violations of 
precautions elicit fearful reactions (indicated in the boxes in Fig. 2.2). 
According to PRST, permissions and obligations subsume both social con-
tracts and precautions. This suggests two alternative predictions. The first 
alternative assumes that people mentally translate permission and obligations 
illto social contracts and precautions before completing the task (this is 
depicted in Fig. 2.2 under the heading "PRST predicts"). Under this scen-
ario, violations of permissions and obligations should elicit a mixture of 
anger and fear (the predicted emotions are given in italics). Some people will 
interpret the rules as social contracts and select the angry face, while others 
will interpret the rules as precautions and select the fear face. However, sub-
jects may be more confused on the abstract obligation task because the ante-
cedent, "situation I arises" suggests no clear interpretation as either a benefit 
or a danger. Should such confusion arise, one might predict a random pattern 
of responding on the abstract obligation task. 
Indeed, subjects might fail to mentally translate either deontic rule into a 
social contract or precaution and instead try to complete the task on the basis 
of the abstract forms of the rules. Under this second alternative, PRST pre-
dicts that people will be confused, or otherwise unable to complete the task in 
any principled manner, and will select one of the four emotions at random for 
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PRST predicts: 
(Abstract) Permissions ---.po Anger and fear 
Socia! contracts 
(Anger) 
t 
Precautions 
(Fear) 
(Abstract) Obligations 
Socia! contracts 
(Anger) 
seT predicts: 
t 
Precautions 
(Fear) 
Others? 
(???) 
---IIop. Anger and tear 
Others? 
(???) 
Implicit social contracts --.....,.., Anger 
(Abstract permissions) 
t 
Social contracts 
(Anger) 
Figure 2.2 Emotions associated with ab~tract deontic rules according to PRST and SeT. 
Emoliolls that have previously been demonstrated to he associated with social contracts (anger) 
and precautions (fear) are underlined and in bold. Emotions predicled io he associated with 
abstract permissions and obhgations are indicated in italics. 
both the permission and the obligation rules, due to the very abstract nature 
of the rules. Since this basically amounts to random behaviour, I have not 
modelled this option in Fig. 2.2. 
PRST cannot, however, argue that people will have a default tendency to 
associate abstract permissions with anger. Not only would this concede 
Cosmides' (1989) c1aim that people interpret abstract permissions as though 
they were social contracts, but it would also weaken the claim that 
precautions are readily interpreted as permissions since these rules would 
then evoke different emotions-a distinction that would not appear to be 
warranted by PRST. 
SCT predicts a different pattern of performance (see Fig. 2.2 "SCT pre-
dicts"). According to Cosmides' analysis of abstract permissions, people 
interpret these rules as social contracts, so there should be a clear preference 
for selecting the angry face. However, SCT offers no clear predictions for 
performance with an abstract obligation, nor does a theory of hazard man-
agement (Fiddick, 1998; Fiddick et aI., 2000). The problem, suggested above, 
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is that the abstract obligation offers no dear interpretation as either a social 
contract or a precaution. 
What did subjects do? 
In a replication of previous findings, a majority of subjects selected the angry 
face for the abstract social contract problem (67 per cent of selections) and 
the fear face for the abstract precaution problem (86 per cent of selections, 
Fig. 2.3). The interesting question, though, is what emotions subjects selected 
for the abstract deontic rules. Did they select a mixture of emotions as pre-
dicted by PRST or did they select a single emotion-anger-as predicted by 
SeT, at least \vith respect to the permission rule? The modal response of the 
subjects was to select the angry face for both the abstract permission problem 
(43 per cent of selections) and the abstract obligation problem (48 per cent of 
selections). The ncxt most frequent selections were the disgust face for the 
abstract permission (29 per cent of selections) and the fear face for the 
abstract obligation (24 per cent of selections). The remaining emotions \vere 
selected by less than 20 per cent of the subjects for both deontic rules. 
This experiment provides additional support for SCT's account of 
abstract permission rulcs. Not only did the emotions selected on the abstract 
permission problem match that predicted by SCT, but the percentage of sub-
jects selecting the angry face for the abstract permission problem was slightly 
lower than that observed on the abstract social contract problem. This is 
precisely the pattern that would be expected if people interpreted thc abstract 
permission as an implicit social contract. Given that the abstract social 
100 
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Anger Disgust Fear 
Emotion selection tasks 
Rule type 
o PermiSSion 
[:J Obligation 
!it1 Social contract 
II Precaution 
Happiness 
Figure 2.3 Percentage of participants selecting an emolion for each of the emotion selection 
tasks. 
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contract is a better eXCI11 plar of a social contract than the abstract permis-
sion, the formcr should elicit a clearer pattern oC emotion selections than the 
latter. 
Neither of PRST's alternative set of predicliom was supported. Subjects 
\vere not guessing when they completed the dean tic problems (ruling out the 
second alternative, performance would be random) and they showed a clear 
preference Cor selecting the anger face for both dcontic rules (ruling out the 
first alternative, a bimodal response pattern f'or both rules). 
Although the results of this experiment disconfirm PRST and lend sup-
port to Cosmides' (19R9) claim that people interpret abstract permission rules 
as social contracts, it is not clear whether Cosmidcs' analysis is entirely cor-
rect. The problem is that a slightly higher perccn tage of participants selected 
the angry face on the ahstract obligation problem than \vas observed on the 
abstract permission pro blern. but the abstract obligation lacks precisely those 
features that Cosmides invoked to interpret the permission as a social con-
tract For example. while it might be plausible to suggest that one is "permit-
ted" to do things one considers a benefit, it is less straightforward to assume 
that a "situation arising". and presumably beyond one's control, is a benefi t 
that obliges one to take an action. This is not to dcny that participants are 
interpreting the abstract permission rule as a social contract. I merely wish to 
suggest that participants might be interpreting both the abstract permission 
and the abstract obligation as social contracts Cor some reason other than the 
one provided by Cosmides. 
One possible alternative explanation is a cultural bias in the West to inter-
pret fights and duties in contractual terms (Shweder. Mahapatra, & Miller, 
1987). Given rules stating vague permissions and obligations. the subjects in 
this study, who were all highly educated Westerners. might invoke a default 
cultural bias to interpret deontic rules in contractual terms. Such a bias 
would lead a sizeable proportion of subjects to view both abstract permissions 
and abstract obligations as contracts. 
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE RESULTS 
FOR THE STUDY OF DEONTIC REASONING? 
While there are major dilTerences in theoretical explanations of deontic rea-
soning (Almor & Sloman. 1996: Cheng & Holyoak. 1985: Cosmicles, 1989: 
Cummins, 1996a; Manktelow & Over, 1991: Oak sCord & Chatel', 1994; 
Sperber et al., 1995), recent studies on abstract deontic rules have done little 
to assess the relative merits of these different positions. For the most part. 
these studies have either focused on theoretlcally trivial manipulations, such 
as whether "not-P" and "not-Q" are stated explicitly or implicitly on the cards 
(Girotto et aI., 1992; Jackson & Griggs, 1990; Kroger et aI., 1993); or they 
have focllsed on manipulations already known to have an cllcct on reasoning 
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about dean tic rules, such as whether one is instructed to look for violations of 
an existing rule or instructed to look for violations in order to establish the 
rule's existence (Noveck & O'Brien, 1996; cf. Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). In 
general, these studies appear to have been motivated by an attempt to either 
undermine or support what is taken to be some of the best evidence in favour 
of PRST, but ,>vithout. thereby. advancing any alternative account of deontic 
reasoning. No studies that I am aware of have attempted to use abstract rules 
to decide among rival accounts of deontic reasoning. This is an oversight 
because the demonstration that people reason correctly on abstract deontic 
versions of the selection task is highly problematic for some rival accounts of 
deontic reasoning. 
The findings presented here do not simply end with it negative verdict 
against PRST. they also give positive support for a spedlic class of deontic 
reasoning theories. The abstract social contract and abstract permission rules 
that T have employed here are considered to be paraphrases by all who accept 
the psychological reality of dcontic reasoning, so the question inevitably 
arises: Which version is paraphrastic and which version is primitive? Of 
course. neither rule may be psychologically primitive-both may be tokens 
of some other type of rule-··but until an alternative candidate is proposed, 
the current state of the field can be roughly divided in two. On the one side 
there are those who assnme that deontic concepts are psychologically primi-
tive (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cummins, I 996a) and on the other there are 
those who assume that deontic concepts can be further decomposed into 
costs and benefits or other more specific terms (Cosmides, 1989; Manktclow 
& Over, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 1994). The results presen ted here would 
appear to support the latter position, but 110t everyone accepts the psycho-
logical reality of deontic reasoning-·-at least not as evidenced by the Wason 
selection task. 
Nondeontic accounts of abstract deontic rules 
Some researchers have questioned the need to postulate domain-specific rea-
soning mechanisms to account feJr people's reasoning on abstract deontic 
versions of the Wason selection task (Ahnor & Sloman, 1996: Sperber et aI., 
1995). These researchers \vould not necessarily deny that people possess a 
deontic reasoning competence, only that it has not been demonstrated by 
people's performance on the selection task. To bolster these claims, they have 
presented evidence that it is possible to elicit high levels of "P & not-Q" 
selections on abstract nondeontic versions of the selection task. Given that 
the interpretation at' the results that I have adopted here assumes that some 
more specialized forms of reasoning underlie performance on abstract 
dean tic versions of the selection task, it is worth considering these claims in 
more detail. 
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Almor and Sloman (1996), for example, have demonstrated enhanced 
levels of "P & not-Q" selections with abstract nondeontic versions of the 
Wason selection task employing rules such as: "If a large object is stored, 
then a large container must be used". Almor and Sloman (1996, 2000) inter-
pret their results as being problematic for the deontic reasoning theories 
because it undermines what they take to be a prediction of the theories, 
that only deontic rules will elicit high levels of "p & not-Q" selections. As 
foreshadowed in my discussion of SCT and precautions, this is not a gen-
eral prediction made by SeT, nor is it a prediction made by olher theories 
of deontic reasoning. As is the case with SCT and precautions, the error 
is in taking the aims and claims of the deontic theorists out of context. 
The theory's claims were largely retrodictive in attempting to account for the 
differences between those rules that Iwd and those rules that had not 
elicited high levels of normatively correct performance on the Wason 
selection task·--.. -a distinction that had roughly corresponded to the 
difference between deontic and nondeontic rules when the theories were 
proposed. 
No deontic theory has proposed that nondeontic rules would always fail 
to elicit correct performance on the selection task. Any number of theor-
etically trivial manipUlations, such as negating the consequent or explicitly 
prompting subjects to look for instances of "p & not-Q", could conceivably 
improve performance on nondeontic versions of the selection task. The real 
question is whether or not people reason differently about deontic and 
nondeontic fules regardless of whether nondeolltic rules elicit "P & Q" 
selections or "P & not-Q" selections. Of course, logically different perform-
ance on the selection task constitutes prima facie evidence for different 
reasoning processes, but even so there is no guarantee that different reason-
ing processes are at play. Indeed, the "matching bias" explanation for the 
elIect of negated consequents proposes that there really is no difference in 
subjects' reasoning (or lack thereof) despite the logical difference in 
periormance with standard conditionals. Subjects are simply ignoring the 
negation and selecting the same cards that they would with nOll-negated 
consequents, with performance guided in both cases by the topic of the rule 
(Evans, 1989). What is required to undermine the deontic theories is not 
simply to demonstrate logically identical performance on both deontic and 
nondeontic versions of the selection task, but to provide a convincing 
argument that performance on both versions of the task is guided by the 
same principles. 
Ahnor and Sloman's (1996, p. 379) proposed explanation is that: 
According to our intLlitions·~the same intuitions that have guided us in con-
structing the problems we llsed-----people's performance in the selection task is 
governed by their beliefs about the dependence relations in the problem. This 
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belief causes them to form probabilistic expectations that they can test as they 
select ca rds. 
But it borders on a tautology to claim that in a test of conditional reasoning 
beliefs about dependence relations governs subjects' performance. Nor does it 
provide any further insight to note that when subjects' selections conform to 
the normative interpretation of the rule as the material conditional that rele-
vant expectations arc those that "happen to have a structure like conditional 
implication" (Almor & Sloman, 1996, p. 375). Other than demonstrating that 
people can solve nondeontic versions of the selection task at levels com-
parable to those found with deontic versions, Almar and Sloman pro-
vide no independent confirmation or argumcn t that people do have these 
expectations when solving both deontic and nondeontic versions of the 
selection task. 
A more promising Hne of explanation is provided by Sperber et aL's 
(1995: see also Liberman & Klar, 1996; Love & Kessler, 1995) Relevance 
Theory account of the selection task. Sperber et a1. present a detailed 
account of the principles guiding performance on both deontic and nonde-
ontic versions of the selection task. The key to enhanced performance on all 
versions of the selection task is whether or not the conversational pragmatics 
of the task: (1) make violating instances of "P & not-Q" manifest (although 
not necessarily explicitly); and (2) highlight the relevance of detecting 
violations. 
The device that they employ to elicit correct performance on nondeontic 
versions of the task is to place the conditional rule in the context of a deniaL 
When it has been alleged that "P & not-Q" is true, one can deny the claim by 
stating: "If P then Q", which is logically equivalent to claiming "JL is not the 
case that P & not-Q". Most importantly for present concerns, Sperber et a1. 
(1995, Experiment 4, The Machine Problem) demonstrated this with an 
abstract letter and munber task. In one condition of their experiment it was 
alleged that a machine has mistakenly produced cards with the features "6-
on-the-front & not-E-on-the-back". A repairman then fixed the machine, 
denying that the machine is still malfunctioning by stating: "If a card has a 6 
on the front, it has an E on the back". As predicted, subjects performed well, 
with 57 per cent correctly solving the task. Further strengthening their claims 
to have isolated the relevant 'variables, when they systematically removed 
elements of the scenario that highlighted violating instances of "p & nat-Q" 
and the relevance of detecting violations, they observed that performance 
decreased accordingly. 
Although providing an elegant and convincing demonstration of their 
proposal with respect to nondeontic versions of the selection task, this 
experiment does not In itself provide a convincing demonstration that the 
same principles are at play in deontic versions of the selection t<lsk. While 
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the deontic theories agree with Sperber et al.'s analysis in suggesting that 
there is some practical utility to detecting deontic rule violations, 7 they part 
ways with the Relevance Theory account over the assumption that the con-
text needs to highlight violating instances. The question is reaJly how much 
structure must be supplied by the scenario and, conversely, how much can be 
supplied by knowledge structures in the mind of the reasoner. The deontic 
theories assnme that a large amount of the relevant structure is built in to 
the mind of the reasoner, while the Relevance Theories assume that the 
supporting scenario supplies almost all of this structure. 
Consider, in this light, Cheng and Holyoak's (1989, p. 289) abstract pre-
caution scenario, a close variant of which was employed in the experiments 
reported here: 
Suppose you are responsible for ensuring whether people who are about to 
engage in certain hazardous activities have taken the precautionary measures 
necessary for protecting them from harmful effects inherent in those activities. 
The precautions take the general form: [fone is to take the hazardous aclivity fl, 
tlien one must !Jape protection P, where H is any hazardous activity and P is the 
appropriate protection for the particular activity. 
White it is apparent from this scenario that there would be some practical 
utility to detecting violations of the rule, neither the rule nor the surrounding 
context highlights "p & not-Q" as violations of the rule. Contrast this with 
Sperber et al.'s "machine problem" where the story stated that: "the machine 
has printed cards it should not have printed. On the back of the cards with 
a 6, the machine has not always printed an E: sometimes it has printed an 
A instead of an E" (Sperber et a1. 1995, p. 75). High levels of violation 
detection result in botb cases, but it requires more coaxing on the part of the 
experimenter in the case of nondeontic versions of the selection task. 
Expanding upon Sperber et a1.'s own metaphor, it would appear that it is 
possible to cook up nondeontic versions of the selection task that elicit high 
levels of violation detection by following their proposed recipe, but following 
such a strict recipe is not required in the case of deontic versions of the task. 
When the supporting devices employed by the Sperber et a1.'s (1995) "rele-
vant" versions of the selection task afe removed, the deontic content effect 
still persists (Fiddick et aI., 2000). Moreover, many of these relevance cues are 
generally absent from abstract deontic versions of the selection task, so it is 
not surprising that Relevance Theoretic accounts of the selection task (e.g. 
Liberman & 10ar, 1996; Love & Kessler, 1995; Sperber et at, 1995) have 
, Strictly seaking, Sperber et a1. (1995) argue that the detection of violations has to have some 
degree of "cognitive dIcet". However, this concept of cognitive dIcet is rather vaguely defmed 
and does not seem to rule out cognitive effects derived from detecting other outcomes like mutual 
cooperation (sec Fiddick et aI., 2000, for further discussion). 
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virtually ignored abstract deontic versions of the task in their account of the 
"deontic content" effect.R Hence it would appear that there is a genuine 
deontic content effect worth accounting for. Su bjects are competent at detect-
ing deontic rule violations over a wide range of pragmatic contexts, whereas 
with nondeontic versions of the selection task, various ad hoc contextual 
elements need to be incorporated before substantial levels of violation 
detection are elicited. 
The brittleness of the Relevance Theories is further underlined by the 
emotion study presented here. There are, as I have suggested above, good 
evolutionary grounds for predicting that anger will be associated with viola-
tions of social contracts and fear will be associated with violations of precau-
tions. The evolutionary analysis of deolltic reasoning was, therefore, able to 
provide some guidance beyond the Wason selection task, but it is not clear if 
or how the Relevance Theoretic perspective can provide any guidance in 
making predictions for the emotion study. The finding that different emotions 
are associated with social contracts and precautions not only reinforces the 
view that social contracts and precautions are psychologically distinct, but it 
further suggests that the psychology of cooperation and hazards is far richer 
than the simple dichotomy of "reasoning" versus "interpretation" favoured 
by the Relevance Theorists. 
The modular view of mind espoused by evolutionary psycholOb'Y does not 
only entail domain-specificity, for example, the psychological dissociation 
between social contracts and precautions. It also suggests the "vertical", as 
opposed to "horizontal", organization of the mind in which special-purpose 
representations, inferences, memories, and even emotions are all integrated to 
bring about adaptive functioning (Fodor, 1983; Gigerenzer, 1995; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990). In putting the disparate pieces of the functional puzzle 
together, a considerable degree of constraint is placed upon enumeration of 
psychological adaptations, potentially solving evolutionary psychology's 
"grain problem" (see Chapter 3). Hence, the parallel dissociation between 
social contracts and precautions in terms of both elicited emotions, as pre-
sented here, and reasoning processes, as studied previously (Fiddick, 1998, 
unpublished; Fiddick et aI., 2000), suggests that the proposed characteriza-
tion of these rules and the adaptive problems they map onto is couched at the 
right grain of ana lysis. 
In contrast, while the Relevance Theoretic approach is not only plausible 
but may even have some rigour in the context of one highly constrained 
task, such as the selection task, these accounts threaten to degenerate into 
the trivial claim that people act on the ba:-;is of their representation of the 
materials provided as additional methodologies demonstrate systematic 
, For a more extended defence of SeT ag<linst the relevance theoretic acco\mts of the selection 
task. ~ee Fiddick et al. (2000). 
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dissociations in the psychology of cooperation and hazards. Hence, nancvo-
lutionary accounts of reasoning are likewise susceptible to the grain problem. 
The constraints of vertical integration also come to the fore in the assess-
ment of some other deontic theories that I have not directly addressed so 
far: Cummins' (1 996a, 1999) Dominance Theory and assorted Decision 
Theoretic accounts of deontic reasoning (Kirby, 1994; Manktelow & Over, 
1991. 1995; Oaksford & Chater, 1994). 
Dominance Theory and deontic reasoning 
Aligned on the side ofPRST is Cummins' (1996a, 1999) Dominance Theory. 
Where PRST claims that permissions and obligations are rules imposed by an 
authority for a social purpose, Cummins gives the theory an evolutionary 
gloss by proposing that social living within dominance hierarchies has shaped 
the human mind (and that of other species as well) for reasoning about the 
"social code"--n.!Ies imposed and enforced by high-ranking individuals to 
maintain their priority of access to fitness-enhancing resources. ]n contrast to 
PRST, which proposes that dcontic reasoning schemas are compiled from 
extensive ontogenetic experience with social rules and regulations, Domin-
ance Theory hypothesizes that the deontie concepts of permission, obligation 
and prohibition are innately built-in to the human milld, enabling fast-tra<..:k 
learning of the rules and regulations of one's community. Cummins' pro-
posal highlights the diversity of opinion found within the evolutionary 
psychology community, even within a narrowly restricted topic such as 
deontie reasoning. Besides tracing deontic reasoning to a different set of 
selection pressures than does SCT, Cummins also places a greater emphasis 
on a comparative approach than is found within Cosmides and Tooby's 
programme. 
Given the close affinities between Dominance Theory and PRST, the for-
mer suffers the same problems as the latter in accounting for the findings 
presented here. Namely, the theory has a difficult time accounting for why 
subjects perform better on the abstract adaptive problems than the abstract 
deontic problems. However. it is the results of the emotion study that pose the 
greatcst difficulty for Dominance Theory as it is presently rormulated. \Vhile 
Dominance Theory gives a reasonable account of people's reasoning about 
social contracts-rules regulating access to benefits--·--reasoning about pre-
cautions deviates from the theory in two respects. First, the dissociation in 
emotions evoked by violations of social contracts and precautions is not 
predicted by Dominance Theory given that it, like PRST, treats social con-
tracts and precautions as psychologically equivalent rules-·deontic rules 
pure and simple. Second and more specifically, the emotion study suggests 
that people are less prone to punish violations of precautions than violations 
of social contracts. This is evidenced by their tendency to get angry, a prelude 
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to punishing the transgressor, when social contracts are violated but not when 
precautions are violated. Hence, it is unlikely that enforcement of the "social 
code" motivates people's reasoning about precautions quite like Dominance 
Theory predicts. The theory would be more consistent. it would seem, if it 
abandoned the claim that deontic reasoning is a unified phenomenon 
encompassing both social contracts and precautions, and concentrated on 
social contracts alone. 
Decision-theoretic accounts of deontic reasoning 
Allied with SCT, at least with respect to abstract deontic fules, are various 
decision-theoretic accounts of deontic reasoning (Kirby, 1994; Manktelow & 
Over, 1991, 1995: Oaksford & Chater, 1994). Like SCT, these theories stress 
the importance of perceived costs and benefits and, hence, are similarly chal-
lenged to explain why subjects succeed in their reasoning about abstract 
deontic rules when it is not readily apparent how detecting violations of these 
rules would increase one's subjective utility. While Cosmides' (1989) inter-
pretation of abstract permissions in terms or social contracts provides a 
common defence for both thesc decision-theoretic accounts and SeT and 
these theories, thereby, derive some support from the abstract selection task 
study presented here, these utilitarian theories find little support in the emo-
tion study. Like Dominance Theory, the decision-theoretic approach is 
generally taken to apply uniformly to both social contracts and precautions 
(Manktelo",· & Over, ] 991, 1995). but as the results of the emotion study 
demonstrate, social contracts and precautions are clearly dissociable in terms 
of their associated emotions. This suggests a psychological differentiation 
of these rules not captured by the decision theoretic approach. 
While the results of the emotion study suggest that social contracts and 
precautions should be distinguished, the opposite conclusion is suggested by 
M ankte10w and Over's (1990, 199 L 1995) semantic analysis of deontic 
statements. Borrowing the methods and results of analytic philosophy, 
Manktelow and Over have asked "what it means to say" that one "may" or 
"must" perform an act. They conclude that any proper semantic analysis of 
deontic statements must ultimately refer to people's preferences/perceived 
uti lities and on these grounds there is no distinction between social contracts 
and precautions. In either case, we prefer that the rules are not violated and so 
we say that "If one does X, then one MUST do Y", whereas when we arc 
indifferent to the outcome we say "one MAY do Y". HO\v is vertical integra-
tion possible when the emotions pull one \\'a)' and semantic intuitions pull the 
other? 
One way of resolving this impasse is to consider the design constraints that 
the various psychological hlculties are subject to. Whereas the emotions 
are functionally integrated \vith cognition and motivation (Lazarus, 1991) 
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suggesting a richness of psychological articulation, our linguistic abilities, 
which I am assuming semantics to be a part of, are under a strong design 
constraint to be economicaL for example, information has to pass through a 
serial channel bottleneck (Pinker & Bloom. 1990), suggesting that the seman-
tic system might be impoverished in comparison (although this represen-
tational poverty may be compensated for by pre- and postcommunicative 
inference, see Sperber & Wilson. 1995). The upshot is that the semantic sys-
tem mighL simply for communicative purposes. group things like social con-
tracts and precautions (not to mention I!e(essily and possihi/iry, which also 
share the modal operators "must" and "may") that the rest of the mind 
distinguishes. Although we may have easier cognitive access to the semant.ic 
system, it may provide only a rough map of the mind's design. 
CONCLUSION 
Dcspite frequent pronouncements of its demisc, SCT remains a viable theory 
of people's reasoning about social exchange. Over the past decade there have 
been refinemcnts in the predictions of the theory, especially with respect to 
performance on the Wason selection task (Gigcrenzer & Hug, 1992), but 
these changes have been within the spirit of the core tl1eorY···-·1he computa-
tional theory of social exchange (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). The theory has. 
unfortunately, had its fate too closely tied to findings from the Wason selec-
tion task. This narrow focus on a single method has distorted the intellectual 
debate about social cooperation. It has provided a false sense of psycho-
logical cohesion between social cooperation and hazards due to the logical 
analysis of selection task performance under which both social contracts and 
precautions are interpreted as eliciting the same pattern of responding. It has 
also encouraged alternative accounts of cheater detection based solely on 
methodological artifacts limited to the selection task. Moreover, it has 
obscured other facets of the psychology or social cooperation and hazards, 
such as associated emotions. Yet there is also much we have learned from 
using the selection task. What is called for is not an abandonment of the 
selection task as some have called for (Sperber et a1.. J 995). but converging 
lines of evidence from different methods and the second experiment reported 
here is, 1 hope, a stcp in that direction. 
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